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THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION MAKES 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
Jennifer L. Hochschild* 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIC-
TIMS. By Kristin Bumiller. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 1988. Pp. x, 161. $19.95. 
PLURAL BUT EQUAL: BLACKS AND MINORITIES IN AMERICA'S PLU· 
RAL SOCIETY. By Harold Cruse. New York: William Morrow & Co. 
1987. Pp. 420. $22.95. 
One of the main rewards of studying race in America is that racial 
politics constantly overturns conventional assumptions about "what 
goes with what." We usually think we know how left- and right-
wingers differ on politically salient issues. We further assume that, at 
least among well educated people, 1 knowing a person's view on one 
issue enables us to predict his or her views on similar issues. People 
who seek liberation for African-Americans also seek liberation for wo-
men, opposed the Vietnam War, and are sympathetic to political and 
economic refugees from Third World nations - or so we assume. 
Conversely, people who assert that poor black women participate in 
their own victimization seldom promote radical reform of the legal 
system - or so we assume. The two books under review here have 
little in common, but they share the great virtue of forcing us to recon-
sider such assumptions. This strength is so great, in fact, that it may 
outweigh the flaws in style and substance that unfortunately permeate 
both books. Because their argument and tone differ, I will first con-
sider them separately, then return to their common unsettling proper-
ties in the final section of the review. 
Kristin Bumiller's book, The Civil Rights Society, focuses on "the 
social construction of victims" by examining how antidiscrimination 
law harms the people it is intended to benefit. The book's "central 
point" 
is that antidiscrimination ideology [as articulated in contemporary civil 
rights law] may serve to reinforce the victimization of women and racial 
• Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University. B.A. 1971, Oberlin College; 
Ph.D. (Political Science) 1979, Yale University. - Ed. 
1. Ever ·since Philip Converse published The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (in 
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT (D. Apter ed. 1964)), we have been unable to assume that very 
many people, especially those without a college education, are ideologically constrained in the 
way I allude to here. 
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minorities. Instead of providing a tool to lessen inequality, legal mecha-
nisms, which create the legal identity of the discrimination victim, main-
tain divisions between the powerful and the powerless by means that are 
obscured by the ideology of equal protection. [p. 2] 
These means include primarily "dialectical exchanges between victims 
and oppressors ... [in which] individuals acquiesce in discrimination 
struggles by acc,epting the 'invisible bonds of the victim': exclusion, 
sacrifice, and distortion" (p. 3). By exclusion, Bumiller means that 
victims "are often signifiers of what the dominant culture sees as evil"; 
by sacrifice, she means willing submission to victimization through 
some combination of guilt and mistaken martyrdom; by distortion, she 
means apparently irrational behavior by victims which is actually "a 
powerful mechanism for survival" (pp. 72-77). In other words, an-
tidiscrimination law creates an expectation that victims will recognize 
and protest their bad treatment. When the victims refuse to fight 
either because they anticipate losing more than they might gain or 
because their character has been warped by the experience of victimi-
zation, they add the burden of guilt and frustration to the burdens of 
poverty and bias they already endure. The book is an extended exami-
nation of this irony (without, unfortunately, any hint of leavening 
from ironic humor). 
The Civil Rights Society begins with several standard critiques of 
civil rights law. It first describes "the civil rights consciousness" -
the common perception that the problem of race is best understood as 
Gunnar Myrdal's "American dilemma" and that its solution lies in 
"the power of the law ultimately to change discriminatory attitudes 
and behavior" (p. 4). This consciousness derives from a "model of 
legal protection" based on the fourteenth amendment, which has pro-
duced at least two harmful effects. First, the courts have used antidis-
crimination law as much to limit as to extend governmental authority 
to eradicate bias. Second, Americans have learned to view the legal 
order as distinct from and superior to the political and social realm, 
thereby "creat[ing] the illusion that law is a source of power and au-
thority disconnected from other power structures in society" (p. 10). 
In a second critique of civil rights law, Bumiller points out that 
"progressive" "legal elites" have developed "process theory" to show 
the Supreme Court how to "broaden the scope of antidiscrimination 
doctrine" without contravening democratic authority (p. 11). The 
goal of process theory is to show that judicial decisionmaking is neu-
tral - therefore good, from a liberal perspective - and should be 
allowed to change structures of choice and decisionmaking in ways 
that benefit the disadvantaged. It invokes procedures to. make sub-
stantive changes (pp. 11-13). Despite its progressive intentions, how-
ever, process theory's main effects have been to drain the "moral 
urgency" from the "political discourse of the civil rights society" (p. 
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11) and to "inhibit[]" the courts' efforts to "move toward greater 
equality" for disadvantaged groups (p. 12). 
Finally, Bumiller argues for "the full recognition of the rights of 
social groups" as well as of discrete individuals, argues against relying 
on litigation to end inequality and discrimination, and provides a sam-
ple of the "overwhelming evidence that the enforcement of anti-
discrimination policies has been a dismal failure" (pp. 14, 19-21, 25-
26). 
None of this is new or particularly illuminating. What is distinc-
tive about this book, as Bumiller points out, is that radical criticisms 
seldom. "examin[e] the law in the context of everyday struggles" (p. 
21). After a (mercifully) brief ramble through Mannheim's definition 
of ideology, Marcuse's discussion of repression; and Foucault's theory 
of law as power (pp. 30-33), The Civil Rights Society finally arrives at 
its destination: intensive interviews with eighteen men and women 
who perceive themselves to be victims of racial, gender, or age dis-
crimination in employment. 
This research has methodological flaws, in particular the absence 
of a comparable group of people who face conflict and frustration in 
their jobs that they do not ascribe to discrimination. Without such a 
group, we can conclude nothing about whether the failure to take legal 
action against discrimination is responsible for the distinctive effects 
- sacrifice, exclusion, and distortion - Bumiller found among her 
interview subjects. That is, if young white men who do not receive the 
pay or promotions they think they deserve also react like Bumiller's 
subjects by withdrawing from the conflict and squelching their anger, 
then this story is about powerlessness and hierarchy, not about dis-
crimination and civil rights law. Conversely, if young white men react 
to or feel differently about experiences analogous to those of minori-
ties, then Bumiller's claims about the. distinctive consequences of an-
tidiscrimination law become very powerful. As it is, we simply do not 
know how young white men denied advancement act or why, so we do 
not know what to infer from the results she reports. 
Another flaw in Bumiller's analysis is her failure to provide an in-
dependent judgment, or information from which readers can conclude 
for themselves, about the extent of discrimina#on her interviewees suf-
fered. I noted this problem after reading, at the end of a detailed and 
moving description of age discrimination against a would-be depart-
ment store saleswoman, that the respondent was seventy-six years old 
at the time she was refused a job (pp. 53-55). Trying to analyze my 
surprise, I realized that I had been assuming the victim to be in her 
fifties or even sixties. My point is not that employers may legitimately 
refuse to hire almost-octagenarians (perhaps they may not); my point 
is rather that Bumiller asks us to assume that all claimants of discrimi-
nation are equally oppressed. That cannot be assumed. If Bumiller's 
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goal is to examine only the psychological and behavioral consequences 
of perceptions of discrimination, this concern is irrelevant. But if she 
wants to analyze the consequences of discrimination tout court, as 
though there is a single identifiable thing called "discrimination," she 
owes us a definition and some discussion of tl~e relationship between 
perceptions and the thing itself. 
Nevertheless, we can set aside these questions about just what The 
Civil Rights Society aims to accomplish in order to focus more directly 
on what it actually says. Here my complaint is different: The book 
provides too little of the engrossing and very powerful interviews. A 
naive quantitative measure suggests the problem. Of the 117 -pages of 
text, only six are devoted exclusively to the respondents' stories and 
only an additional twenty analyze their reactions to their experie11ces. 
To make the point differently, Bumiller mainly analyzes the three dis-
tinctive features of victims - exclus.ion, sacrifice, and distortion -
through "secondary soqrces ... [containing] accounts of persons sub-
jected to extreme·:~ '. victimization," such a.S slaves and concentration 
camp prisoners (pp. 71-72). Would it not have been more appropriate 
and more interesting to make the views of her subjects the central 
component of this discussion? - , . 
I intend this criticism as a back-handed compliment. Those pages 
that do report and analyze the victims' ang~r, helplessness, courage, 
and sheer power of endurance are simply wonderfµl. They' alone m~e 
it worth plowing through the rest of the book. But I am frustrated by 
thoughts of what remains unharvested from the interView transcripti;. 
Despite my frustration, the varied respop.ses of these victims help 
illustrate the contention that the study of Americaµ race relations can 
jar conventional assumptions about "what goes with what.'~ Three 
features of The Civil Rights Society can serve as examples of this con-
tention. Consider first its subjects. On the one hand, they are victims, 
and in that role they demonstrate all kinds of weakness. They exag-
gerate their bosses' power and capriciousness; they occasionally erupt 
in unproductive violence; they possess a false consciousness, suffering 
from both "an illusion of choice" (p. 59) and a "limited imagination" 
(p. 76); they are dependent, docile, confused, ~d even idolatrous (p.-
62); they denigrate themselves; they identify with the oppressor; and 
so on. On the other hand, they are people with wlion;i Bumiller em-
pathizes and for whom she seeks respect, and in that role they demon-
strate great strengths. They understand the relationship between the 
self and socially ascribed personas; they love and act courageously on 
behalf of their families; they teach themselves self-sufficiency; they act 
generously toward other victims and even oppressors; they show pride, 
dignity, and a sense of honor. In short, they demonstrate "remarkable 
potential for the survival of human autonomy despite stultifying social 
conditions" (p. 69). 
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Bumiller here is walking a tightrope. She wants to insist both that 
victimization has terrible consequences and that victims are not pitia-
ble or terrible people. It is easy to see why a right-thinking radical 
would want to have it both ways, but it is hard to do so successfully. 
Can victims suffer extensive and irremediable damage and be strong 
and worthy of respect? Does one claim not contradict the other? The 
Civil Rights Society is not the first book to walk that tightrope, and 
perhaps an understanding of how it comes to such a precarious situa-
tion will show its political and intellectual ·import. · 
For decades after the Civil War, scholars largely ignored slavery 
and its consequences. In 1918, however, Ulrich Phillips published the 
profoundly influential book, American Negro Slavery, in which he por-
trayed slaves less as the victims of a malign institution than as almost 
willing recipients of a benign system of paternalistic protection. After 
all, he wrote: 
[t]here were injustice, oppression, brutality and heartburning in the re-
gime, - but where in the struggling world are these absent? There were 
also gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual loyalty to a degree 
hard for him to believe who regards the system with a theorist's eye and 
a partisan squint. For him on the other hand who has known the consid-
erate and cordial, courteous and charming men and women, white and 
black, which that picturesque life in its best phases produced, it is impos-
sible to agree that its basis and its operation were wholly evil, the law 
and the prophets to the contrary notwithstanding.2 
By the mid-1950s, scholars' views had changed dramatically. Stanley 
Elkins' Slavery represents the second generation of studies of black 
victimization. Elkins rejected Phillips' benign view; instead his work 
was so suffused with white liberal guilt over the horror of slavery that 
it portrayed the slave as a completely victimized "Sambo": 
Sambo, the typical plantation slave, was docile but irresponsible, loyal 
but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior 
was full of infantile silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggera-
tion. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and 
childlike attachment: it was indeed this childlike quality that was the 
very key to his being. 3 
Elkins assured his readers that not every slave was a Sambo and that 
Sambo-like qualities were not racially based. Indeed, his famous anal-
ogy between American slavery and Nazi concentration camps was 
designed as much to show that infantilism is not race-specific as that 
slavery was as bad as the Holocaust. But the overall impression left by 
Slavery was that African-Americans were helpless and dependent. 
2. u. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 514 (1918). My characterization of Phillips, 
as of Elkins and the other authors discussed here, is too condensed to do justice to the nuances of 
their writing. It nevertheless, I hope, captures the essence of their arguments. 
3. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL 
LIFE 82 (1959). 
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Much of the history of slavery and its consequences written during 
the 1960s and 1970s can be read- too schematically, to be sure- as 
a choice between these two equally unacceptable models of victimiza-
tion. Scholars could argue, with Phillips, that contemporary African-
Americans are not psychologically and socially damaged because slav-
ery was not really so awful after all. Or they could argue, with Elkins, 
that American slavery was so horrific that slaves (and therefore their 
descendants) were devastatingly and irreparably damaged. Very 
roughly speaking, Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family can 
be seen as a successor to Elkins, and Robert Fogel and Stanley En-
german's Time on the Cross serves as a successor to Phillips, without 
the racism and perhaps only with regard to the material circumstances 
of slaves.4 
The third generation, intellectually if not temporally, of "victimi-
zation scholars" sought to escape these poles. Eugene Genovese's 
Roll, Jordan, Roll and Herbert Gutman's The Black Family in Slavery 
and Freedom best exemplify the having-it-both-ways school of thought 
to which Bumiller belongs. 5 They, like she, wanted to argue both that 
slavery and racial discrimination were intolerably oppressive and that 
slaves and their descendants survived the oppression with dignity, 
strength, and moral rectitude. Genovese's discussion of slaves' "ac-
ceptance" of slavery shows this 'balancing act in process: 
The slaves defended themselves effectively against the worst of their mas-
ters' aggression, but they paid a high price. They fought for their right 
to think and act as autonomous human beings, but it was a desperate 
fight in which they could easily slip backward. . . . Most found ways to 
develop and assert their manhood and womanhood despite the danger-
ous compromises forced upon them. They had manifested strength. But 
... the intersection of paternalism with racism worked a catastrophe, for 
it transformed elements of personal dependency into a sense of collective 
weakness.6 
It is important to clarify the precise nature of Genovese's (and Bumil-
ler's) high-wire act. It is not a search for an Aristotelian mean; Geno-
vese did not say that slaves' deep dependence combined with their 
assertive separatism to produce an appropriately interdependent com-
munity. He and Bumiller make the much more interesting and com-
plicated argument that slaves and their descendants were at once 
deeply dependent and proudly autonomous. The precarious balance 
consists in giving approximately equal emphasis to two contradictory 
arguments rather than combining them or trading them off against one 
4. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Actlon, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT 
AND THE POLITICS OF CoNTROVERSY (L. Rainwater & W. Yancey eds. 1967); R. FOGEL & s. 
ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE EcONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974). 
5. E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972); H. GUT-
MAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976). 
6. E. GENOVESE, supra note 5, at 148-49. 
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another to yield a conclusion somewhere in between. 7 
Orlando Patterson's and Glenn Loury's twin Public Interest arti-
cles, "The Moral Crisis of the Black American," and "The Moral 
Quandary of the Black Community," respectively, best represent the 
fourth generation of this scholarship. Both argue (Patterson with 
more elegance and analytic rigor) that African-Americans must, to be 
full moral agents, reject all claims as victims and accept responsibility 
for their past as well as their future. As Patterson put it: 
There can be no moral equality where there is a dependency relationship 
among men; there will always be a dependency relationship where the 
victim strives for equality by vainly seeking the assistance of his victim-
izer. No oppressor can ever respect such a victim, whatever he may do 
for him, including the provision of complete economic equality. In situ-
ations like these we can expect sympathy, even magnanimity from men, 
but never - and it is unfair to expect otherwise - the genuine respect 
which one equal feels for another. 8 
Loury agrees: 
The pride and self-respect valued by aspiring peoples throughout the 
world cannot be the gift of outsiders - they must derive from the 
thoughts and deeds of the peoples themselves. Neither the guilt nor the 
pity of one's oppressor is a sufficient basis upon which to construct a 
sense of self-worth.9 
In Loury's hands, this claim takes the form of the traditional con-
servative plea for self-help and abjuration of dependence on govern-
ment hand-outs. In Patterson's hands, the same claim takes a tum 
toward support for "constructive public rebellion," by which blacks 
and other ethnic groups with "a potentially common class interest" 
create "a total, almost revolutionary change in American society."10 
The politics of victimization does indeed make strange bedfellows. 
The point of this brief review is not to argue for one or another of 
these schools (although the older I get, the more compelling I find 
Patterson's combination of tough-minded cultural conservatism and 
expansive economic radicalism). Here I make only the preliminary 
point that the whole issue of victimization is politically and morally 
unsettling. Can one claim to be deeply victimized and still reject self-
pity and patronization? Can one claim responsibility for the future 
7. I am blurring the distinction between slavery and post·Civil War race relations for two 
reasons. First, my concern is the analytic question of how to think about victimization, not the 
historical question of how victimization and victims changed over time. Second, although many 
of the books I describe focused on slavery, they had an implicit (and sometimes explicit) goal of 
interpreting artd c0mmenting on contemporary race relations. Thus, the distinction between 
slavery and post-war race relations is often less important in scholarly practice than in theory. In 
short, my claim is not that Bumiller is contributing to the history of slavery - she obviously is 
not - but rather that the ways historians have thought about slavery and its aftermath give us a 
context for understanding her work. 
8. Patterson, The Moral Crisis of the Black American, 32 PUB. INTEREST 43, 52 (1973). 
9. Loury, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, 79 PUB. INTEREST 9, 11 (1985). 
10. Patterson, supra note 8, at 68. 
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without accepting blame for the past? Is the radical claim of black 
power really the same as the conservative demand for self-help? More 
precisely, if outside intervention prolongs dependency, must liberals 
and radicals renounce any efforts to aid victims - thus joining con-
servative calls for governmental inaction? 
Bumiller is maddeningly vague on these and similar questions. 
Despite her wide-ranging reviews of various theoretical and historical 
literatures, she never refers to the history of victimization studies. 11 
Thus she ignores the issue of whether the tightrope she walks can 
carry her either to a description of victims who are bloodied but un-
bowed, or to a prescription for intervention that is potent but not pa-
tronizing. As Bumiller, calling on Foucault as a model for 
understanding but not prescribing, puts it, her book offers "no new 
'expert' advice about liberation strategies" (p. 113). 
Given Bumiller's express renunciation of prescription, it is perhaps 
unfair to press the point much further. Nevertheless, I will do so, 
since escape from the status of victim is so important and so intellectu-
ally complex. Here is the second way in which The Civil Rights Soci-
ety induces us to rethink "what goes with what." Bumiller first 
appears to agree with Patterson and Loury that. victims must make 
their own future, since she concludes the sentence just quoted with 
"but I project a revisionist view t4at allows subjects to reexamine their 
fate" (p. 113). However, she also calls for a reformulation of the un-
derpinnings of civil rights law: 
[C]ontemporary society ... can begin to recreate a language of rights 
that responds to the struggles and needs of those who experience social 
and economic disadvantage. . . . · 
. . . . [W]e need to begin the search for a restatement of rights that 
abandons the objectivity and individuality of current doctrine and that 
recognizes the. interests of social groups and individuals. People who . 
possess salient group identities need to find in the law reinforcement for 
the expression of their individual selves and positive referents for the 
qualities they share as a collectivity. [pp. 112, 116] 
Bumiller's hint of prescription may be correct, although it IS hard to 
tell just what it means without further development. But whatever its 
virtues, it places liberation not in the hands of those to be liberated, 
but in the hands of legal scholars and lawmakers - just the people 
responsible for victimization to begin with (if Genovese and Bumiller 
are right), and just the people who cannot, despite the best intentions, 
liberate victims (if Patterson and Loury are right): 
My point here is neither to criticize Bumiller nor prescribe myself, 
but rather to show once again how this book forces· us to ·confront our 
desire to join perhaps incompatible claims. Can one consistently argue 
11. Bumiller also makes no referenee to a ·roughly analogous line of research in feminist 
theory and gender studies. 
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both that liberal law and politics deeply oppress racial minorities and 
women and that the law presents opportunities to these victims to lib-
erate themselves? I am not sure, and the contortions that Genovese, 
Gutman, and Bumiller all occasionally engage in suggest that they too 
are not sure. Similarly, can one claim both that victims must liberate 
themselves and that elites must radically reform political and legal 
structures in order to liberate victims? Again, neither I nor Bumiller, 
who ducks the issue, is sure.12 
A third way, probably inadvertent, in which this book jars our 
conventional assumptions was suggested earlier but warrants closer at-
tention. Glenn Loury is typically labeled a neoconservative; Orlando 
Patterson is economically radical but culturally conservative; Kristin 
Bumiller presumably thinks of herself as a radical critic from the left. 
Yet their arguments have striking similarities. Each argues that the 
American legal system perpetuates victimization, that victims must 
liberate themselves, and that liberation requires radical reformulation 
of the links among individuals, groups, and society. While I earlier 
suggested ways in which commonly joined assumptions warrant sepa-
ration, here my point is that conventionally separated political views 
may be closely connected. The Civil Rights Society, whatever else it 
does or does not do, deserves praise for inducing us to rethink "what 
goes with what." 
The penultimate paragraph of Bumiller's book rather surprisingly 
provides a transition to Harold Cruse's Plural But Equal Bumiller 
warns: 
We are currently experiencing ... a proliferation of antidiscrimination 
strategies. Such proliferation can be seen as the logical extension of the 
universalization of rights - by including all groups, it further dilutes the 
benefits received by the historically most disadvantaged groups. . . . 
[U]niversalization of rights has led to increasing tensions between racial, 
ethnic, and feminist groups. Spokespersons for black interests, who fear 
that proliferation of rights will dissolve their minimal gains, have begun 
to object to civil rights strategies that fail to give priority to disadvan-
taged blacks. [p. 117] 
Here is where Cruse begins. In a long, rambling set of repetitive rumi-
nations and sharp insights, Cruse takes on the NAACP, liberal Jews, 
feminists, white ethnics, Asians and Latinos, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Jesse Jackson, Brown v. Board of Education, and other targets - all in 
defense of the special claims of blacks against those who would deny 
their uniqueness or be parasitic on their strength. 
Plural But Equal covers a lot of ground. One theme was just sug-
gested: an attack on groups other than African-Americans for trying 
to squeeze under the umbrella of black-led civil rights agitation and 
12. Patterson and Loury are sure, and their answer is "no." See Patterson, supra note 8, at 
68-69; Loury, supra note 9, at 11. 
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legislation. Cruse has sharp words for white ethnics and feminists (of 
both races) who claim the same entitlement to relieffor past harms but 
who, he claims, have suffered nowhere near the same degree of oppres-
sion as blacks (especially men). As he puts it, in the first of many such 
passages: 
[B]lacks were the unabashed catalysts behind the ethnic consciousness 
aroused in the Sixties. Who was stopping the white ethnics from seeking 
constitutional redress of grievances before the Brown decision? Nothing 
or no one but the plain fact that white ethnics had no real constitutional 
argument in the first place! . . . 
. . . White ethnics did not need the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments, or a hundred years of litigation and court deci-
sions, to legitimize their social status. And when one examines the 
pantheon of American achievers ... and finds ... numerous ... decid-
edly un-WASPish luminaries, it means that the American Dream was 
not always the sleepless nightmare of nonrecognition that inspired Mar-
tin Luther King's "I Have a Dream."13 
Furthermore, Cruse points out bitterly, "European immigrants re-
mained, for the most part, socially distant if not hostile to blacks" (p. 
56). He is no more enamored of feminists, who refuse to see that 
"equalizing political and economic rights according to gender means 
undermining the political and economic rights of nonwhite minority 
groups" (p. 364-65). 
Another theme in Plural But Equal is an historical account of how 
African-Americans have arrived at their current impasse - without a 
strong leader, a coherent program, or popular support. Cruse argues 
that the Du Bois-Washington debate over political integration versus 
separate economic development has been the prototype for all impor-
tant conflicts among blacks in the twentieth century. The book traces 
the development of this conflict from the origins of the NAACP, 
through its legal maneuvering over school desegregation, and up to the 
implications of "noneconomic liberalism" for Jesse Jackson and the 
urban underclass. It portrays the NAACP, and black and liberal 
white elites more generally, as misleading and even betraying the black 
masses by insisting over and over on legalisms and integration rather 
than on autonomous political, economic, and cultural development. 
Cruse is especially acrimonious about the historical role of Jewish 
board members and financial supporters of the NAACP who provided 
"debilitating leadership" by creating and· insisting upon "the guiding 
white philosophy of noneconomic liberalism" (p. 79). 
A third theme of Plural But Equal is an internecine argument 
among black political , activists. Cruse sees plenty of blame to go 
around. In addition to feminists, Jews, and ethnic revivalists, he casti-
gates black neoconservatives for censuring ghetto dwellers, black civil 
13. P. 57. Emphasis is in the original in all quotes from Cruse unless otherwise noted. 
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rights leaders for single-minded assimilationism, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. for opposing black power and wasting his moral capital on the 
Vietnam War, and Jesse Jackson for political cowardice. Quoting a 
few of Cruse's critiques may suggest the flavor of this book. On King: 
He "had been led, unwisely, to compromise his established civil rights 
legitimacy by taking a public stand against the Vietnam War .... The 
catch here was that the privileges of equal citizenship carried with 
them an equal obligation to fight America's wars, whether these wars 
were considered just or unjust" (p. 260). On Jackson's 1984 presiden-
tial campaign: "[I]n his haste for the laurels of political notoriety ... 
Jesse Jackson squandered too much of his potential by opportunisti-
cally following the imaginary bait of electoral politics at the presiden-
tial summit, while neglecting the more crucial and fundamental and 
obligatory talk of political organization at the bottom, the independent 
black political party" (p. 386). And most important, on the NAACP: 
[T]he NAACP's program became increasingly irrelevant in the 
Seventies. . . . ' 
... The NAACP could not return to past polices and principles to 
regain clarity of leadership in the present and future, since it was pre-
cisely its past policies and principles that hopelessly trapped it in its con-
temporary programmatic crisis .... [T]he NAACP could have redeemed 
its flagging prestige and legitimacy by ... encouraging the National 
Black Political Convention movement to pursue the organizational pos-
sibilities of the independent black political thrust. . . . [Instead it] main-
tained the prerogative to discourage and delegitimize black ideological 
departures not consistent with its leadership ideologies. [pp. 357-59] 
What unifies all these attacks, and raises the book from a cranky 
jeremiad to occasional eloquence and power, are the two goals that 
Cruse is arguing/or. He seeks to reclaim the despised concept of "sep-
arate but equal" by recasting it as "plural but equal," and to foster 
"cooperative economic organization" in aid of poor blacks. His con-
stituencies, in other words, are appropriately nationalistic African-
Americans and poor African-Americans. Let us consider each argu-
ment in tum. . 
Cruse's most concrete discussion of "plural but equal" lies in the 
arena of school desegregation. He points out that school desegrega-
tion in the South following Brown made black teachers and principals 
"superfluous." Instead of endorsing "discrete implementation of the 
principles of local control [and] the elimination of public school segre-
gation by law, while allowing the parental option of voluntary choice 
of local school enrollment," Cruse argues, the "irresponsible and ro-
mantic black leadership" allowed the nebulous issue of integration to 
eliminate "one of the natural foundations of political leverage in the 
coming struggle for black political power" (p. 249). In short, Cruse 
apparently agrees with the white Southern stance that dominated the 
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years from Little Rock to Green v. County School Board: 14 namely, 
that no matter what the Supreme Court says, parents do and ought to 
have the right to send their children to whatever local public school 
they wish. Black opposition to mandatory school desegregation is not 
new, but such a strong statement of that view still startles those of us 
brought up to believe that support for desegregation was a rough-and-
ready indicator of commitment to racial equality. 
Cruse's slogan of "plural but equal" goes beyond separate schools 
and an independent black political party. At its broadest, it calls on 
"the minority group ... to organize its own economic, political, and 
cultural potential for a showdown across the bargaining table to obtain 
an equal share of the resources of any society" (p. 252). This call is 
also not new; Cruse, after all, issues it in the midst of a discussion of 
the Black Power movement of the 1960s. But it is a striking claim, 
especially in the contemporary political context. 
Plural But Equal's other deep commitment is to "economic coop-
erative organization" (p. 340) - otherwise known as socialism in one 
community. Here he is especially concerned about "the magnified 
black millions of the Eighties existing below the poverty line, whom 
the nation and its uplift forces and agencies cannot rescue" (p. 383). 
They need not "myths surrounding . . . equal protection regarding 
race and economics in a free-market," but "collective enterprises 
among blacks, ... collective determination ... in cooperative economic 
efforts" (p. 384). Cruse's commitment to poor blacks generates some 
of his most eloquent passages excoriating middle-class blacks for their 
"creation of empty slogans"; their "puny ... intellectual, scholarly 
and creative output"; and their development as a "mindless ... empty 
class" that lacks "a clearly defined social mission" and that fails to 
recognize the need for nationalism and intraracial cooperation (pp. 
384, 389). 
I have quoted so extensively from Plural But Equal for two rea-
sons. First, Cruse is so wordy that it is impossible to briefly articulate 
his views in his own words. Second ano more important, whatever 
value the book has lies in its political agenda and rousing polemics, not 
in its substantive arguments or analytic rigor. And only the author 
himself can adequately convey that agenda and tone. There is no 
point in examining Plural But Equal in the same way we examined 
The Civil Rights Society, by placing it within a scholarly literature or 
querying its logical and methodological rigor. Plural But Equal is not 
that kind of book, and could not stand up to that kind of analysis. 
Instead, we should look at it as the opening salvo in a new round of 
debate over 'the value and content of black nationalism. 
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Cruse's words, free choice plans "ought to have been imple-
mented at the very outset of school desegregation no matter what the Brown decision said .... " 
P. 249. 
1596 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1584 
It is in this context that Cruse's book most strongly challenges our 
assumptions about "what goes with what." White liberals intuitively, 
but vaguely, see black n~tionalism as a movement of the left, similar to 
and allied with feminism, opposition to the Vietnam War, sympathy 
for undocumented immigrants, and hostility to white separatists. 
They tend also to see Booker T. Washington as a conservative apolo-
gist for Jim Crow, and W.E.B. Du Bois as a radical exponent of black 
pride and black Marxism. Plural But Equal belies all those vague in-
tuitions. Cruse is hostile to feminism, whether black or white, because 
it contributes to the denial of black men's "option to play out the role of 
man of the household" (p. 369). He is no more hospitable to new im-
migrants than to old ones, since "in the Far West, . . . black popula-
tions [are] practically lost in a melange of Asians and Latinos, all 
prevailing and countervailing for minority handouts from the golden 
pot of the American Dream" (p. 360). Cruse remembers the Vietnam 
War mainly as a diversion of King's attention from more important 
concerns about black power and black economic development. He ret-
rospectively agrees with Southern resisters that the proper response to 
Brown should have been parental freedom of choice within a de jure 
desegregated school system. He sees Washington as the precursor of 
cooperative economic development, and Du Bois (at least before 1934) 
as elitist and assimilationist. None of this will seem new to veterans of 
the black nationalist debate since the 1960s.15 But I predict that, be-
yond that small and rather incestuous world, most whites and some 
blacks will be confounded by Cruse's disavowal of what are to many 
liberals almost canonical affiliations. 
It would be less than honest to ignore the simple fact that Plural 
But Equal is not a very good book. It is repetitive, unfocused, and 
self-indulgent. Although they are mercifully few, such sentences as 
"[i]n retrospect, the Seventies would unfold as the transitional decade 
leading to the fateful 1980s" (p. 269) are hard to overlook. Cruse does 
not understand aggregate data analysis but makes the mistake of chal-
lenging its use and interpretation. The whole book needs severe edit-
ing and some effort at systematic organization. I was originally 
annoyed at its lack of a table of contents and substantive section and 
chapter titles, the absence of which tends to disorient the reader. I 
decided by the end that this lack was not an oversight, but rather an 
indication of the despair that someone (whether author or editor) must 
have felt in trying to decide just what each section and chapter was 
about. 
Nevertheless, I am reluctant to criticize Cruse's book too severely, 
and not only out of respect for the man who twenty years ago wrote 
15. For a very useful description of the internecine debates among black nationalists in the 
1960s and 1970s, see Marable, Black Nationalism in the 1970s: Through the Prism of Race and 
Class, SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-June 1980, at 57. 
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Crisis of the Negro Intellectual If this book represents more than the 
idiosyncratic views of one emeritus professor - if it really does signal 
a resurgence of black nationalism after the assimilationist quiescence 
of the 1970s and 1980s - then its arguments are very important no 
matter how poorly presented. No one can predict when or to what 
degree black nationalism will revive. But given the twentieth century's 
unremitting tension between nationalism (represented by Marcus Gar-
vey, Malcolm X, and Imamu Baraka) and integrationism (represented 
by the NAACP and National Urban League), we can confidently pre-
dict that it will revive.16 And if common reports of strains between 
black and white feminists, 17 between blacks and new immigrants, 18 
and between blacks and Jews19 represent more than authorial sensa-
tionalism, then Cruse's suspicion of the "me too's" and snakes-in-the-
grass must be taken very seriously as an indicator, if not a fomenter, of 
mutual recriminations. 
From the outside (as a white Jewish female), I am not persuaded 
that a small, poor, and relatively powerless minority should pursue a 
nationalism that pushes away all potential allies. Such a strategy 
seems self-defeating at best. But from the inside - if Cruse represents 
the inside - that form of nationalism is logically and emotionally 
compelling. And regardless of one's perspective, Americans of all 
races and persuasions should find Plural But Equal a valuable guide to 
contemporary black nationalist sentiments. 
It is perhaps banal, but nevertheless important, to conclude that a 
book shows us how left and right have more in common than either 
side, or most observers, believe. Both Plural But Equal and The Civil 
Rights Society present themselves as far to the left of mainstream 
American politics. Yet both concur in major arguments with those 
they would probably include among the enemy. My point is not that 
they are mistaken or inconsistent; we can easily see how each book's 
own frame of reference leads it to this apparently odd position. My 
16. Adolph Reed argues that African-American scholars and activists must transcend the 
distinction between integrationism and nationalism since it reflects "a narrow focus on racial 
tactics and .•. [a] penchant for ahistorical dualism." See A. Reed, The Political Thought of 
W.E.B. Du Bois: Liberal Collectivism and Elite Consolidation Among Afro-Americans (1988) 
(unpublished manuscript). I agree, but this is not the place to pursue that discussion, since Cruse 
sticks closely to the traditional dichotomy. 
17. See, e.g .. B. HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING F'EMINisr; THINKING BLACK 177-83 
(1989). A more illuminating study of tensions within feminism, focusing in this case on His- . 
panic-Anglo relations, is Lugones & Spelman, Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, 
Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for "The Woman's Voice," 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INTL. F. 
573 (1983). 
18. See, e.g., Schmalz, Dreams and Despair Collide as Miami Searches for Itself, N.Y. Times,, 
Jan. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 2; Salholz, A Conflict of the Have-Nots, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1988, at 
28-29. 
19. See J. KAUFMAN, BROKEN ALLIANCE: THE TURBULENT TIMES BETWEEN BLACKS 
AND JEWS IN AMERICA (1988); Kramer, Blacks and Jews: How Wide the Rift?, NEW YORK, 
Feb. 4, 1985, at 26-32. 
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point is rather that the fundamental contradiction between the fact of 
racial subordination and the American ideology of freedom and op-
portunity pushes all careful thinkers into positions that seem anoma-
lous from some perspective. That was certainly the case for Thomas 
Jefferson20 and Hinton Rowan Helper21; it is equally the case for Bu-
miller and Cruse. In different ways, these two books lead us once 
again to face that contradiction and to realize how much responsibility 
it bears for the peculiarities of American political thought and 
practice. 
The juxtaposition of these two books suggests a final way in which 
they make us rethink comfortable assumptions. Just who are the vic-
tims, or the most victimized? Cruse's answer, over and over, is 
"blacks," especially poor blacks. · Bumiller's implicit answer is 
"blacks, Latinos, white women, and the elderly" - everyone who can 
attribute their subordination to ascriptive categories. Her interviews 
elide precisely the differences among types of victims or degrees of 
victimization that Cruse wants to insist upon. I can imagine a conver-
sation between Bumiller and Cruse in which each accuses the other of 
inappropriate special pleading for some victims at the expense of other 
equally worthy ones. 
Awarding the prize of "most victimized" to any particular group 
seems to me a bootless enterprise. But my imagined dialogue between 
Bumiller and Cruse should alert us to the political and psychological 
stakes attendant on the question of which victims deserve what kind of 
treatment. However one arrays people along the dimension of victimi-
zation (including the refusal to engage in such an exercise), one can 
responsibly do so only by realizing that one's allies and enemies will be 
disconcertingly different than one anticipated. For that important in-
sight, we have The Civil Rights Society and Plural But Equal to thank. 
20. See J. MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY (1977). 
21. H. HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH (1963) (1st ed. 1857). 
